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Abstract 
 
Background 
 
Since 2003, 25% of UK general practitioners’ income has been determined by the quality of their care. 
The 65 clinical quality indicators in this scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) are in the 
form of ratios, with financial reward increasing linearly with the ratio between a lower and upper 
threshold. The numerator is the number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved and the 
denominator is the number of patients the practices declares are suitable for the indicator.  The 
number declared suitable is the number of patients with the relevant condition less the number 
exception reported by the practice for a specified range of reasons. Exception reporting is designed to 
avoid harmful treatment resulting from the application of quality targets to patients for whom they were 
not intended. However, exception reporting also gives GPs the opportunity to exclude patients who 
should in fact be treated in order to achieve higher financial rewards. This is inappropriate use of 
exception reporting or ‘gaming’. Practices can also increase income if they are below the upper 
threshold by reducing the number of patients declared with a condition (prevalence), or by increasing 
reported prevalence if they were above the upper threshold. This study examines the factors affecting 
delivered quality (the proportion of prevalent patients for indicators were achieved) and tests for 
gaming of exceptions and for prevalence reporting being responsive to financial incentives.  
 
Data 
 
We used routinely available data on the Quality and Outcomes Framework from Scottish practices 
(n=916) for 2004/05 and 2005/06. We also include data on practice characteristics and on socio-
demographic and morbidity factors from the 2001 census and the Scottish Index of Multiple 
Deprivation.  
 
Methods 
 
Multiple regressions of delivered quality, exception reporting, and prevalence reports on practice and 
patient characteristics. We test for gaming of exception reporting by comparing the rates of exception 
reporting in 2005/6 for practices which were above the upper threshold in 2004/5 (which would have 
had no incentive to increase exception reporting) with practices which were below the threshold in 
2004/5 (which would have had a financial incentive to increase exception reporting rates. We also 
compared prevalence reporting in 2005/6 for practices above the upper threshold in year one (who 
would gain financially by increasing prevalence) with those below the threshold in year one (who 
might not).  
 
Results 
 
90.8% of practices reported levels of achievement above the upper thresholds. They could have 
reduced the number of patients treated by 12.4% without reducing income, indicating a degree of 
altruistic behaviour.  Delivered quality was lower in practices with more income deprived patients and 
with a higher proportion of ethnic minority patients, though the effects of these variables were quite 
small. 
 
Practices which were above the upper threshold for an indicator in 2004/05 had higher prevalence in 
2005/6 compared to practices that were below the threshold in 2004/05.  
 
For exception reporting, practices which were below the upper threshold for an indicator in 2004/05 
had higher exception reporting rates in 2005/6 than practices which were below the upper threshold. 
From the differences between the two types of practice, we estimate that, in practices which were 
below indicator thresholds in 2004/05, 0.87% of patients might have been inappropriately exception 
reported in 2005/06, or 10.9% of the overall number of patients exception reported.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The results suggest that general practitioners are partially altruistic in that the majority produced 
markedly higher quality than was required to maximise their financial rewards.  
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Exception reporting removes incentives towards inappropriate or over-treatment of patients. But the 
QOF provides perverse incentives for gaming of exceptions and we find evidence that practices which 
performed worse in 2004/5 were more likely to game exceptions in 2005/6.  
 
The incentives in QOF also affect case finding and reporting by practices and we find evidence that 
practices which performed worse in 2004/5 had lower reported prevalence in 2005/6.  We also find 
that reported prevalence rates are associated with practice characteristics, such as whether the 
practice was a fundholder, suggesting that the QOF prevalence reports may not be a reliable 
epidemiological resource.  
 
JEL Nos: H51, I18 
 
Keywords.  Quality.  Incentives.  Gaming.  Pay for performance.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In April 2004 the UK National Health Service (NHS) introduced what is possibly the most elaborate 
and expensive explicit pay for performance scheme in any health care system, or indeed in any 
organisation anywhere (Roland, 2004).  All 10,000 general practices in the UK were required to report 
their achievements on 146 quality indicators in the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).  The 
average practice, containing four general practitioners (GPs), stood to gain around £130,000 per year 
in 2005/6 if it achieved all indicators to the maximum extent, and the amount paid out to practices 
under the QOF was around £1,000M in 2005/6.1  
 
The QOF was not trialled before it was introduced simultaneously in all four parts of the UK. There are 
no national data on the performance of practices on the QOF indicators before the QOF was 
introduced. Consequently there is only fragmentary evidence on the effect of the QOF on incentivised 
and unincentivised activities.  The tentative conclusion from studies based on limited sets of indicators 
in small samples of practices (Gulliford et al, 2006; Campbell et al, 2007), is that the quality of care in 
general practice had been increasing since the late 1990s, but that the QOF may have led to a further 
increase above this trend.   
 
In this paper we construct a model of behaviour under the QOF by semi-altruistic GPs who care about 
their income and about patient welfare. We test the model using data from Scottish practices in 
2004/5 and 2005/6.  
 
Around half of potential QOF revenue is attached to indicators of clinical quality measured by the ratio 
of treated patients to the number of patients reported to be eligible for the indicator. For example, 
indicator CHD6 is the proportion of eligible patients with coronary heart disease whose blood pressure 
is controlled.  Practices are paid a price per point achieved and the number of points achieved 
increases linearly with the proportion treated between a lower threshold (0.25) and an upper threshold 
(0.70) (see Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1.  Achievement and points for a continuous quality indicator (CHD6) 
 
Since increasing the number of patients treated is costly for GPs, only GPs willing to trade-off income 
for improved patient health will have performance above the upper threshold for a clinical indicator.  
Practice performance under the QOF is consistent with a substantial degree of altruism. In 2005/6 
90.8% of practices were above the upper threshold for indicators and could, on average, have 
reduced the number of patients treated by 12.4% without affecting their QOF revenue. 
                                                 
1
 2005/6 is the financial year 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2006.  Similarly for the financial year 2004/5. 
1 DU  = 0.70 DL = 0.25 Achievement D = 
N/(P – E) 
So 
Points 
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Expressing a clinical indicator as a ratio is intended to provide an incentive to GPs to increase the 
numerator, i.e. to increase the number of treated patients.  But it is possible for GPs to change the 
denominator, i.e. the number they declare as eligible for treatment. The number declared eligible is 
the number of patients they report as having a condition minus the number they exception report for 
an indicator. It is possible to exception report patients as unsuitable for an indicator on a variety of 
grounds (Appendix A). For example, patients may be exception reported because they are terminally 
ill or because they have refused treatment. Thus practices can increase QOF revenue by gaming their 
reports of both prevalence and exceptions. 
 
We test for gaming of prevalence and exception reporting in two ways.  First, true disease prevalence 
and exception rates are determined by the characteristics of the population served by the practice 
population. They should not vary with characteristics of the practice, such as the type of contract it 
holds or the number of neighbouring practices.  We find that prevalence and exception reporting rates 
vary with population characteristics, such as ethnicity and deprivation, in expected ways. But reporting 
was also significantly affected by characteristics of the practice. For example, exception reporting 
rates were higher in practices that had previously held budgets under the fundholding regime.  This 
test for gaming is vulnerable to the omission of population characteristics that affect true prevalence 
or exceptions and are correlated with the included practice characteristics. We attempt to reduce such 
omitted variable bias by including measures of practice population morbidity, deprivation, rurality, and 
ethnicity. 
 
Our second test for gaming uses the structure of the incentive scheme. The marginal rewards for 
overstating exceptions are positive when the indicator is below its upper threshold and zero when 
above the upper threshold. Similarly, practice revenue is increased by understating prevalence when 
it is below the upper threshold. Moreover, because of another feature of the scheme explained below, 
practice revenue is increased by overstating prevalence when the indicator is above the upper 
threshold. The price per point was increased by 75% between the first and second years of the QOF.  
Thus, for practices below the upper threshold for an indicator there was a considerable increase in the 
marginal financial reward for increasing the proportion of eligible patients treated. For practices above 
the threshold the marginal financial reward from increasing the proportion treated was zero in both 
years. We argue that practices which were below the upper threshold in the first year of the scheme 
would therefore be more likely to increase their reported exception rate and reduce their reported 
prevalence in the second year. Practices already above the upper threshold would only have to 
maintain their first year behaviour to maximise their revenue from the QOF. We find that practices that 
were below the upper threshold in the first year had higher exception rates and lower prevalence 
rates in the second year than practices that were above the threshold in the first year.  
 
Section 2 sets out the QOF in more detail and provides a model of practice behaviour to guide the 
empirical work. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation methods. Section 4 has results and 
section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the results. 
 
 
2. Incentives in the QOF 
 
2.1 GP contracts  
 
The NHS is financed almost entirely from general taxation.  Patients register with general practices, 
which act as gatekeepers for elective hospital care.  Patients face no charges for use of primary care2 
or for the rest of the NHS.   
 
Apart from a small minority (0.8%) who are directly employed by their local primary care organisation, 
Scottish GPs are independent contractors. They are organised in small partnerships with a mean size 
of 4.4 GPs and around 5,200 patients. 
 
                                                 
2
 Apart from a charge for prescription drugs. Because of the wide range of exemptions on grounds of age, income, and health, 
92% of drug prescriptions dispensed were free in Scotland in  2005/6. 
http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/info3.jsp;jsessionid=A436EB8C9E9ED916E8D06A4DDB99020C?pContentID=2237&p_applic=C
CC&p_service=Content.show& 
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GPs are paid under one of two contracts.  Most GPs (90% in Scotland) are in practices with a 
nationally negotiated General Medical Services (GMS) contract under which they are paid by a 
mixture of capitation, lump sum allowances, items of service, and target incentives including the QOF.  
The capitation payments vary with the age of patients and with the deprivation level of the area in 
which they lived. GPs have to meet all their practice expenses from their gross income, except for 
some specific reimbursements for the costs of practice nurses.  Additionally, where there is no local 
pharmacy, GPs are permitted to dispense the medicines they prescribe.  Dispensing practices can 
make a profit from dispensing since they receive a dispensing fee per item and are reimbursed for the 
drugs they buy at a rate that often exceeds the price they paid.  
 
Around a tenth of Scottish practices have opted to be paid under a Primary Medical Services (PMS) 
contract. These contracts are negotiated between the practice and their local primary care 
organisation (Health Board in Scotland). Under the PMS contract, the practice receives a lump sum in 
exchange for agreeing to provide the services they would have provided under the GMS contract, 
plus additional services for particular patient groups.  The amount received is typically the amount the 
practice would have received under GMS, plus an addition intended to cover the cost of the extra 
services. As under GMS, the practice has to meet its expenses from its gross income.  PMS practices 
were required to take part in the QOF, but, because it was thought that they would already be being 
paid for some of the services counting towards the QOF, they had points deducted from their QOF 
score.3 
 
2.2 Quality indicators and practice revenue 
 
The QOF rewards practices according to quality indicators for four areas: clinical (covering eleven 
chronic diseases), organisation (for example whether the practice has an annual review of patient 
complaints and suggestions), patient experience (for example whether the practice has undertaken an 
approved patient survey in the past year), and additional services (the practice offers ante natal care 
and screening).  See Table 1. There are additional points for holistic care (determined by the 
percentage of the available points scored on the third worst disease domain in the clinical quality 
area), for quality practice (determined by the third worst performance in the domains of the three non-
clinical areas), and a bonus based on an access survey.   
 
Table 1. QOF areas: indicators and points 
 Indicators Maximum points 
Clinical quality 76 550 
Organisation 56 184 
Patient experience 4 100 
Additional services 10 36 
   
Holistic care  100 
Quality practice  30 
Access bonus  50 
   
Total 146 1050 
 
There are clinical quality indicators in 11 disease domains (Table 2). We concentrate on the 65 
continuous clinical indicators that are measured as the proportion of relevant patients for whom an 
indicator has been achieved. For example indicator CHD5 is the proportion of patients with Coronary 
Heart Disease whose notes have a record of blood pressure in the last 15 months (see Table 3). The 
indicators carry points that have a monetary value which varies with the size of the practice and with 
the proportion of the practice population in the disease domain.  
                                                 
3
 PMS practices had a deduction of 168 points in 2004/5 and 109 points in 2005/6 from a maximum possible score of 1050 
points  
(www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/pmsagreements0904~pmsnewgms?OpenDocuments&Highlight=2,PMS,QOF) 
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Table 2.  Disease domains: continuous clinical quality indicators, achievement, and reported prevalence. Scottish practices 2004/5, 2005/6. 
Disease domain Number of 
indicators 
Points available Upper threshold 
achievement 2004/05* 
Upper threshold 
achievement 2005/06* 
Reported raw prevalence 
rate (%) 2005/06 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Asthma 6 65 0.78 0.41 0.93 0.15 5.43 1.09 
Cancer 1 6 0.69 0.46 0.92 0.18 0.71 0.23 
CHD 11 95 0.79 0.40 0.95 0.11 4.54 1.16 
COPD 7 40 0.66 0.47 0.89 0.19 1.84 0.93 
Diabetes 17 93 0.75 0.43 0.91 0.13 3.40 0.72 
Epilepsy 3 14 0.65 0.48 0.83 0.24 0.72 0.21 
Hypertension 4 96 0.75 0.43 0.91 0.21 12.08 2.81 
Hypothyroidism 1 6 0.91 0.28 0.98 0.13 2.99 0.94 
LVD 2 16 0.78 0.42 0.93 0.16 0.63 0.28 
Mental health 4 34 0.76 0.43 0.92 0.18 0.59 0.32 
Stroke and TIA 9 27 0.75 0.44 0.94 0.13 1.90 0.57 
Total 65 492       
 
Prevalence rate: List weighted mean of raw prevalence rates. Upper threshold achievement (dom upper): average proportion of indicators in domain for which upper threshold achieved weighted by 
maximum possible points for domain. Figures are weighted by listsize.  CHD: coronary heart disease.  COPD: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  LVD: left ventricular dysfunction.  TIA: 
transient ischaemic attacks. 
* Mean and SD of achievement rates exclude the first indicator of all disease domain, which ask practices whether or not they have a register of patients recorded as having such disease. 
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Table 3.  Example of indicators from Coronary Heart Disease domain 
Indicator Max points Upper 
threshold 
CHD1: Practice has register of patients with CHD (yes/no) 6  
CHD5: Percentage of CHD patients whose notes record BP in previous 15 
months 
7 90% 
CHD6: Percentage of CHD patients whose BP in previous 15 months is 
150/90 or less 
19 70% 
CHD11: Percentage of patients with a history of myocardial infarction 
(diagnosed after 1 April 2003) who are currently treated with an ACE inhibitor 
7 70% 
All lower thresholds in all disease domains are 25 
 
The achievement by practice g on a continuous indicator i in disease domain k is Dgki = Ngki /Dgki = 
Ngki/(Pgk – Egki).  (Table 4 summarises the notation.) Ngki is the number of patients for whom indicator i 
in domain k for whom the indicator is achieved eg the number with CHD whose blood pressure has 
been measured in the last 15 months (CHD5).  Dgki = Pgk – Egki is the number of patients declared as 
suitable for indicator i in domain k. Prevalence Pgk is the number of patients in disease domain k 
reported by practice g. Egki is the number of patients who are exception reported by the practice 
because the indicator is not appropriate for them.  Patients may be exception reported on nine 
grounds (Appendix). For example, terminal cancer patients with hypertension would be excluded from 
the hypertension indicators. Patients who have been invited to attend for treatment on three 
occasions in the preceding twelve months and have failed to attend can also be excluded.  
 
 
Table 4.  Notation 
Pgk prevalent patients reported in disease domain k by practice g 
Dgki patients declared suitable for indicator i in domain k 
Egki = Pgk – Dgki number of patients exception reported for indicator i 
Ngki number of patients for whom indicator i achieved 
Dgki = Ngki/Dgki reported achievement rate for indicator i 
kiLD  lower achievement threshold for indicator i 
DkiU upper achievement threshold for indicator i 
Sgki=Ski(Dgki) points achieved for indicator i 
o
kiS  maximum points achievable for indicator i 
Mg practice population 
V national average price (value) per point 
vgk = vFgk /gM M  value per point for indicators in domain k in practice g 
1 1
2 21 Ggk hk
gk h
g h
P PF
M G M
§ ·§ · § ·¨ ¸ y¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹© ¹ © ¹
¦  
adjusted disease prevalence factor for domain k for practice g 
Rgki = Sgki vgk revenue from indicator i in domain k.  
 
 
The number of points (and hence revenue) earned on an indicator varies linearly with achievement for 
( , )gki kiL kiUD D D . See Figure 1.  No points are earned if D is less than or equal to the lower 
threshold kiLD  (25% for all continuous indicators).  At the upper threshold kiUD  the practice receives 
the maximum number of points okiS  available for the indicator and further increases in achievement 
have no effect on revenue.  The upper thresholds vary across indicators (from 50% to 90%) and the 
maximum points vary from 2 to 56 (Table 5).    
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Table 5.  Summary statistics: rates of achievement, delivered quality, exception reporting for 
41 indicators. Scotland 2005/6 
Indicator Maximum 
points 
available 
Upper 
threshold 
(%) 
% achieving 
upper 
threshold 
Reported 
achievement (%) 
Delivered quality Exception reporting 
(%) 
  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
ASTHMA6 20 70 89.7 80.9 11.0 74.1 11.1 8.8 8.9 
BP2 10 90 98.9 98.2 1.8 97.1 2.2 1.2 1.1 
BP4 20 90 83.6 93.4 4.5 91.4 4.6 2.2 2.5 
BP5 56 70 89.5 79.1 7.2 74.6 7.5 5.8 4.0 
CHD3 7 90 97.5 97.4 2.7 95.7 3.0 1.8 1.7 
CHD5 7 90 97.7 97.5 2.5 95.5 3.0 2.2 2.1 
CHD6 19 70 99.3 89.2 5.3 85.3 5.6 4.5 3.2 
CHD7 7 90 88.4 94.3 4.8 90.4 5.2 4.3 3.4 
CHD8 16 60 95.8 80.5 8.7 72.1 7.9 10.7 5.5 
CHD9 7 90 94.0 95.3 3.3 92.2 3.6 3.4 2.6 
CHD10 7 50 99.2 75.5 11.6 55.0 6.4 27.5 11.1 
CHD12 7 85 93.9 93.0 4.9 80.4 5.9 13.7 6.0 
COPD3 5 90 80.7 92.6 12.2 82.8 12.9 11 8.8 
COPD4 6 90 95.6 96.9 3.7 94.0 4.8 3.2 3.3 
COPD6 6 70 90.3 88.7 14.6 77.4 14.8 13.0 10.1 
COPD8 6 85 94.7 93.6 5.4 80.8 7.3 14.3 7.0 
DM2 3 90 94.1 95.9 3.4 92.5 4.1 3.7 2.8 
DM3 3 90 99.3 98.5 1.8 97.0 2.5 1.5 1.6 
DM5 3 90 98.8 97.8 2.1 94.9 3.0 3.1 2.3 
DM6 16 50 85.5 59.7 10.5 51.5 9.8 13.5 8.5 
DM7 11 85 94.4 92.2 3.8 86.4 4.8 6.4 3.8 
DM8 5 90 76.8 92.7 7.2 86.2 7.7 7.3 5.4 
DM9 3 90 69.0 90.6 7.6 84.8 8.6 6.5 5.0 
DM10 3 90 67.0 89.8 8.2 84.1 9.0 6.7 5.1 
DM11 3 90 99.5 98.7 1.5 96.9 2.1 1.9 1.7 
DM12 17 55 98.5 78.9 8.5 73.0 9.0 7.7 4.5 
DM14 3 90 97.2 96.9 3.3 94.0 4.7 3.0 2.8 
DM16 3 90 96.9 96.7 2.6 93.8 3.5 3.0 2.4 
DM17 6 60 98.1 81.3 7.5 72.7 7.5 10.4 4.9 
DM18 3 85 91.3 92.0 5.5 77.1 6.6 16.3 6.8 
LVD3 10 70 95.1 86.9 8.3 57.0 12.7 20.9 14.1 
EPILEPSY4 6 70 66.8 72.7 13.5 78.8 9.3 9.5 8.7 
MH2 23 90 91.0 96.3 4.6 90.5 10.3 6.1 9.1 
MH5 5 70 80.4 87.7 21.6 69.8 31.7 10 4.6 
STROKE3 3 90 95.1 96.3 3.4 93.5 4.4 3.1 3.1 
STROKE5 2 90 96.8 96.9 3.0 93.6 4.4 3.5 3.8 
STROKE6 5 70 98.1 87.8 6.0 81.9 7 6.9 5.1 
STROKE7 2 90 80.4 92.4 6.4 86.1 7.5 7 5.8 
STROKE8 5 60 92.5 76.7 9.9 65.4 9.5 14.8 7.9 
STROKE10 2 85 85.6 90.5 6.4 75.3 7.6 16.8 7.6 
THYROID2 6 90 96.9 96.9 3.0 96.0 3.1 0.9 1.3 
Reported achievement: N/D; delivered quality: N/(D+E); Exception reporting: E/(D+E).  Denominator weighted means over 
Scottish practices. 
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Formally, the number of points earned by practice g for indicator i in disease domain k is 
    ( ) min{1,max{( ) /( ),0}}ogki ki gki ki gki kiL kiU kiLS S D S D D D D             (1) 
The revenue from indicator i for condition k is the price per point times the number of points  
            ( )gki gk ki gkiR v S D  (2) 
The price per point 
 
g
gk gk
M
v vF
M
                                  (3) 
is the product of the national average price per point v, the adjusted practice disease prevalence 
factor Fgk for disease k for practice g, and the list size of the practice relative to the national average 
list size  Mg/ M , where /g gM M Gc c ¦  is average list size and G is the number of practices. The 
national average price per point v was £70 in 2004/5 and £124.60 in 2005/6.  
 
The adjusted disease prevalence factor is the square root of the practice disease prevalence rate 
divided by the unweighted average of the square roots of the practice prevalence rates in all 
practices:4 
    11 22 11( ) / /Ggk gk gk gk g hk hhF F P P M G P M

ª º  « »¬ ¼¦ ,      ( ) 0gk gkF Pc !          (4) 
Thus practice g revenue from indicator i in disease domain k is  
1 12 2
1
1/ ( ) / ( / )hgki g ki gki gk g hk hR v M M P M G P MS D
ª ºª º ª º ¦¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼   
       ( ) ( )g ki gki gk gkv F PS D                     (5) 
Notice that, provided gki kiLD D! , practice revenue increases with the square root of the list size Mg.  
Guthrie, McLean and Sutton (2006) show that this can lead to large variations in QOF income for 
practices with the same reported prevalence and the same achievement. Moreover, provided 
( , )gki kiL kiUD D D , the marginal revenue from increasing achievement gkiD  also increases with the 
square root of the practice list. Hence practices with more patients have a greater incentive to 
increase N, E and P.  
 
A practice of given size can alter its QOF revenue from a continuous indicator by changing  
 
x the number of patients for whom the indicator is met (Ngki) 
x the number of patients who are exception reported for that indicator (Egki) 
x the reported number of patients with the relevant condition (Pgk) 
 
When ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  increasing the number of patients for whom the indicator is met (Ngki) or 
increasing exception reporting (Egki) will increase revenue.   
 
The effect of reporting a larger number of prevalent patients (Pgk) is more complicated. An increase in 
Pgk reduces achievement Dgki = Ngki/(Pgk – Egki)  and increases the adjusted disease prevalence factor 
Fgk(Pgk).  If gki kiLD D  then ( ) 0ki gkiS Dc   and Ski(Dgki) = 0, so that / 0gki gkR Pw w  .  When 
gki kiUD D!  we have ( ) 0ki gkiS Dc   and Ski(Dgki) > 0, so that /gki gkR Pw w > 0 because of the increase in 
the adjusted disease prevalence factor.  In the intermediate range ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  increases in Pgk 
reduce achievement Dgki  but increase the adjusted disease prevalence factor.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 We ignore the additional complication that the practice prevalence rate is truncated at the 5th centile both in 
calculating the practice rate and the national average rate.   
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We can show (see Appendix) that the overall effect is to reduce revenue from the indicator.  Thus  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )gki gkig gk gki gk gk g gk gk
gk gk
R
v F P v F P
P P
DS D S Dw wc c w w                
= 0,     gki kiLD D  
         0,       ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  
         0,!             gki kiUD D!             (6) 
with marginal revenue jumping down from zero at DkiL and jumping up from negative to positive at DkiU. 
A change in reported prevalence Pgk affects all the indicators in disease domain k, so the effect on 
practice revenue is /gki gki R Pw w¦ which depends on the mix of indicators in the domain for which 
the proportion of patients for whom the indicator is achieved is above or below the upper threshold. 
 
Table 6 summarises the properties of the indicator revenue function.  
 
 
Table 6.  Indicator revenue function: partials and cross partial derivatives 
  Effect on 
  
gkiR   /gki gkiR Nw w  /gki gkiR Ew w  /gki gkiR Pw w  
Change in Achievement level (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Ngki ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  +  0 + – 
 
gki kiUD D!  0  0 0 0 
Egki ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  +  + + – 
 
gki kiUD D!  0  0 0 0 
Pgk ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  –  – – – 
 
gki kiUD D!  +  0 0 – 
Mg ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  +  + + – 
 
gki kiUD D!  +  0 0 + 
Dkiu ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  –  + + – 
 
gki kiUD D!  0  0 0 0 
o
kiS  ( , )gki kiL kiUD D D  +  + + – 
 
gki kiUD D!  +  0 0 + 
Rgki  revenue from indicator i in disease domain k. Ngki number patients indicator achieved for. Egki number exception reported.  
Pgk declared prevalence in disease domain.  Dgki  = Ngki/(Pgk – Egki) achievement ratio. DkiL  lower threshold. DkiU  upper threshold.  
o
kiS  maximum points for indicator.  Mg  practice population.  The effect of practice population Mg is via its effect on the value of 
a point vgk  and the effects of Dkiu and okiS  are via the number of points achieved Ski(Dgki).   
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2.3 A model of the QOF 
 
2.3.1 Optimal treating and cheating 
 
To derive hypotheses to structure the empirical analysis we assume that practice utility is linear in 
patient health and practice income (QOF revenue minus costs) and that there is only one continuous 
clinical quality indicator:   
 
    ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )s N E P bN R N E P C N E P    
             ( ) ( )bN v F PS D      1 1 1/ /o o oN E Pc N c E E P c P P M      
            221 2 22 ( ) /o oN Ec N c E E Pª  «¬  22 ( ) /oPc P P M º  »¼    (7) 
where D = N/(P – E) is practice achievement and /v vM M .  Patient health is proportional to the 
number treated and the parameter b t 0 reflects both technology (the effect of treatment on patient 
health) and the strength of GP altruism.  
 
Eo/Po is the exception rate if the practice used the exception criteria properly and did not game.  E/P – 
Eo/Po is the rate of exception gaming.  Similarly Po/M  is the true prevalence rate and P/M – Po/M is 
the rate of gaming of prevalence reporting. If there was no financial or psychic cost to gaming then all 
practices would achieve at least the upper thresholds and score maximum points.  The inclusion of 
E/P – Eo/Po and P/M – Po/M in the cost function is means of capturing the idea that gaming has a cost 
which may be a psychic cost of offending against professional ethics or the certainty equivalent of a 
financial penalty if caught cheating.  The cost parameters (cN, cE2, cP2 are all positive and cE1, cP1 are 
non-negative. The cost function derivatives with respect to E and P jump from negative to positive at 
Eo and Po. 
 
The derivatives of s with respect to numbers treated, exceptions, and prevalence are 5
 1 2
1( ) ( ) N N
s b v F P c c N
N P E
S Dw c   w                                       (8) 
 1 22 2
1 ( )( ) ( )( )
o o
E Eo o
d E Es N E E
v F P c c
E P E dE P P
S D w c  w                     (9) 
2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
s N
v F P v F P
P P E
S D S Dw c c  w   
    1 2 2
1 ( )o o
P P
d P P P P
c c
dP M M
                   (10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Except at the lower threshold where ( )S Dc jumps from zero to become positive and at the upper threshold were it jumps down to zero 
and at E = Eo (and P = Po) where there are upward jumps in the cost function with respect to E (and P). 
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The seven possible solutions to the problem of maximising (7) subject to non-negativity constraints on 
N, E, and P and to D = N/(P – E)  [0,1] are illustrated in Figure 2.6 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Solution types 
 
(i)  D = 0.  With sufficiently low altruism and high marginal costs of treatment and gaming the practice 
provides no treatment and does not game: N = 0, E = Eo, P = Po. 
(ii)  (0, )LD D .  The practice’s altruism is sufficiently great and marginal cost of treatment 
sufficiently small to lead it to treat some patients but not enough to achieve the lower threshold.  
Because it has not achieved the lower threshold there is no income gain from gaming exceptions or 
prevalence. Hence P = Po, E = Eo and LD (Po – Eo) > N > 0. 
(iii) D = LD . This cannot be a solution.  If D = LD  is the solution it must be true that /s Nw w  is non-
negative for D < LD and non-positive for D > LD . But the derivative of u with respect to N jumps 
upward at D = LD .  
(iv) ( , )L UD D D . The practice fails to achieve the upper threshold but it may game by overstating 
exceptions E > Eo and understating prevalence P < Po if cE1 and cP1 are small enough. 
(v)  D = DU.  The practice just achieves the upper threshold. It may do so by overstating exceptions 
and understating prevalence if cE1 and cP1 are small enough. 
(vi)  ( ,1)UD D . The practice has high enough altruism and low enough marginal cost of treatment 
that it is willing to treat patients even though the marginal treated patient reduces practice income.  
Since the marginal revenue from increased achievement is zero it does not game exceptions (E = Eo) 
even if cE1 = 0 since this will merely increase its costs. Revenue is increased by higher reported 
prevalence and the practice will overstate prevalence P > Po if cP1 is sufficiently small.  
(vii) D = 1.  If N/(Po – Eo) = 1 marginal revenue from reported prevalence is positive.  But if cP1 is 
sufficiently large there is no incentive to overstate prevalence even at P = Po. Thus the solution has E 
= Eo,  P t Po and N = P – Eo.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Preferences in R, N space are given by S(R,N; E,P) = R + bN – C(N,E,P) with the revenue function R = R(N;E,P) given by (5). The 
marginal utility of treatment is SN = b – cNN. 
R(N;E,P) 
(vii)(vi)
(v)
(iv) 
(iii)(ii
(i) 
P – E0 
R 
Du(P - E)( )L P ED   N 
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The solution types are summarised in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Solution types and achievement level 
 
 
2.3.2 Testing for gaming 
 
The utility function s(N,E,P) is not concave and has discontinuous derivatives at the upper and lower 
thresholds. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive some comparative static predictions (see Appendix 
for details).  The optimal values of N, E, and P depend on the practice’s altruism parameter b, cost 
parameters, true prevalence Po, true exceptions Eo, and list size M.  We can establish (see Appendix)  
 
Proposition 1. For any given vector of cost parameters, true prevalence, true exceptions and list size, 
there exist b1, b2, b3, b4 (with b1 < b2 < b3 < b4) such that for all b < b1 the practice optimum has D < DL 
, for 2 3( , )b b b  the optimum has ( , )L UD D D  and for b > b4 the optimum has D  > DU.   
  
It can also be shown that, holding all other parameters constant, changes in the cost function 
parameters which reduce the marginal cost of treatment will also shift the optimum in the same way 
as the increase as the altruism parameter.  We can use the proposition to derive tests for gaming of 
prevalence and exceptions. 
 
Prevalence reporting below and above the upper threshold   
 
Very few practices had D < DL for any indicator. We therefore test for gaming by comparing practices 
with ( , )L UD D D  and D  > DU.  The marginal revenue from an increase in declared prevalence (P) is 
negative for practices with ( , )L UD D D  and positive for practices with D  > DU.  Hence, other things 
than b held constant, practices with ( , )L UD D D  will have declared prevalent prevalence rates P/M 
which are not larger than those with D  > DU. For some sets of cost parameters, with low marginal 
costs of gaming, the prevalence rate for practices with ( , )L UD D D  will be less than those with D  > 
DU.  Thus a comparison of the declared prevalence rates of practices above and below the upper 
threshold with similar observable characteristics affecting cost parameters, true prevalence, and true 
exceptions would enables us to test for gaming of prevalence.   
 
But a test for gaming of prevalence by comparison of practices above and below the upper threshold 
faces the obvious difficulty that unobservable factors that have directly increase reported prevalence 
(for example sicker patients) will make it less likely that a practice with given observable 
characteristics will be above the threshold.  Thus the estimated effect of being above the upper 
threshold would be biased downwards. 
 
Since the new 2004/5 contract embodying the QOF was a radical departure from the previous 
contract it is plausible that practices in 2004/5 would have been uncertain about the performance they 
would achieve.  It is plausible that they would use their achieved performance in 2004/5 to inform 
decisions affecting 2005/6 performance. Those below the upper threshold would realise that they 
needed to increase treatment (N) or reduce reported prevalence (P) or increase exceptions (E) to 
generate additional income in 2005/6.  Those above the upper threshold would know that they could 
only increase income by increasing prevalence. Hence we test for gaming of prevalence reporting by 
DU D1 LD  0 
        N > 0 
        E = Eo 
        P = Po 
 
                            N > 0 
                            E t Eo 
                            P d Po 
 
N > 0 
E = Eo 
P t Po 
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examining whether practices which were below the upper threshold in 2004/5 have a lower reported 
prevalence in 2005/6 than those which were above the upper threshold in 2004/5.  
 
Exception reporting above and below the upper threshold 
 
Since marginal revenue from increased exception reporting is positive when ( , )L UD D D  and zero 
when D  > DU, practices with low enough costs of gaming exceptions will have more exceptions when 
their altruism parameter is low enough to ensure that they choose ( , )L UD D D  than when it is high 
enough that they choose D  > DU. The argument also implies that exceptions as a proportion of true 
prevalence Po will be higher in practices below the threshold. Since such practices will also have a 
lower declared prevalence, exceptions as a proportion of declared prevalence will also be higher for 
practices below the upper threshold.  
 
As with prevalence reporting, we cannot test for gaming by a cross sectional comparison of exception 
reporting of practices above and below the threshold in a year since unobserved factors increasing 
exceptions will increase the likelihood that a practice is above the upper threshold. Hence the test for 
gaming is biased towards rejection of gaming.  Hence we again use the fact that the practice was 
above or below the upper threshold in 2004/5 to test for exception gaming in 2005/6.  Gaming would 
lead to higher exception reporting in 2005/6 for practices below the threshold in 2004/5 compared to 
those above the upper threshold. 
 
Effects of patient and practice characteristics on reported prevalence and exceptions 
 
Po and Eo (true prevalence and exceptions) depend on the characteristics of the practice population, 
not on the characteristics of the practice such as the age of GPs, their country of qualification or 
whether they hold a GMS or PMS contract. Gamed prevalence and exceptions will vary with practice 
characteristics that reflect GP cost or preference parameters.  Thus if practice characteristics are 
associated with reported prevalence and exception reporting, this suggests that practices are gaming 
exceptions, provided there are no omitted practice patient characteristics which affect true prevalence 
and exceptions and are correlated with included practice characteristics.   We include measures of 
population morbidity, deprivation, rurality, and ethnicity to reduce this omitted variable problem. 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We used QOF data on Scottish practices because it was possible to link them to more practice level 
characteristics than for practices in other parts of the United Kingdom. Data on practice achievement 
(N), numbers declared suitable for an indicator (D) and declared prevalence (P) for Scottish practices 
for 2004/5 and 2005/6 are from Information Services Division (ISD) of NHS National Services 
Scotland.7 Only practice-level counts are available and, for confidentiality, these are suppressed if 
they take a value less than 5. We discuss the measurement of prevalence and exception reporting in 
section 3.2.  
 
Practice characteristics such as the proportion of female GPs, the average age of GPs, the type of 
contract (GMS or PMS), list size, number of GPs etc were provided from the GP Contractor Database 
held at ISD and are for 1 April 2005.  ISD also provided information on whether the practice had 
previously held a budget under the fundholding scheme (Dusheiko et al, 2006) which was in operation 
between 1991/2 and 1998/9.   
 
We calculated a measure of the extent to which each practice faced potential competition from other 
practices. Scotland contains 6505 small areas (datazones) containing between 500 and 1000 
residents. We first calculating the Herfindahl index for each datazone based on the squared shares of 
the datazone population on the lists of different practices and then took a weighted average of the 
datazone Herfindahls where the weights were the proportion of the practice population drawn from 
each datazone. 
                                                 
7
 www.isdscotland.org/QOF  
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Practice population morbidity was measured by the Standardised Illness Ratio (SIR.) This is an 
indirectly age standardised measure of the proportion of people reporting a limiting long-term illness 
at the 2001 Census. The Census also provided the proportion of residents in black and ethnic minority 
groups. Census data are available for each of 42,604 Census Output Areas containing on average 
117 individuals in private households. 
 
Table 7.  Summary statistics: explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max 
Patient characteristics      
SIR Standardised Illness Ratio 98.446 22.670 50.533 186.742 
SMR Standardised Mortality Ratio 107.457 25.135 44.199 329.250 
Prop15less Proportion of patients aged 15 or less  0.164 0.029 0.016 0.270 
Prop75plus Proportion of patients over 75 years 0.070 0.021 0.001 0.159 
Inc Income deprivation score 14.962 7.583 2.801 43.409 
Educ Education deprivation score -0.007 0.591 -1.583 1.671 
Ethnicity Minority ethnic group proportion 0.021 0.028 0.000 0.408 
Rural 
Population mode in settlements <3,000 
people 0.107 0.310 0.000 1.000 
Sparsity Inverse of population density (hectares 
per person) 1.516 5.470 0.014 136.375 
      
Practice characteristics      
Pop1000 List size in 000s 5.248 3.259 0.118 23.097 
Gp1000 GPs per 1,000 patients 1.039 0.913 0.263 13.793 
Pfemale Female GPs 0.423 0.255 0.000 1.000 
Avgpage Average age of GPs (years) 44.913 6.123 20.000 67.000 
Pcqnonuk GPs not qualified in UK 0.099 0.225 0.000 1.000 
Pmscont PMS contract 0.105 0.306 0.000 1.000 
Dispensing Dispensing practice 0.136 0.343 0.000 1.000 
Exfh Ex fundholding practice 0.491 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Herf Herfindahl index for areas served 0.366 0.251 0.078 0.998 
      
Based on 916 practices. One observation per practice. Patient characteristics are weighted by list size. Practice characteristics 
are unweighted. 
 
We also measured population health with the Standardised Mortality Ratio (SMR) calculated by ISD 
for each data zone using General Register Office death records for 1999 to 2003 and the 2001 
Census population counts.  
 
Socio-economic factors were taken from the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004.  The Index 
consists of an overall deprivation score calculated from deprivation scores for six deprivation 
domains: income; employment; housing; education, skills and training; health and disability; and 
access to services.  The overall deprivation score and the deprivation domain scores are available at 
data zone level.  
 
The practice values of the measures of health, deprivation, and ethnicity variables were calculated as 
the average of the variable for each geographical area (output area or data zone) from which the 
practice draws its population weighted by the share of practice population in each geographical area.  
 
Summary statistics for the population and practice characteristics are given in Table 7. 
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3.2 Measurement of QOF variables 
 
We estimate models for achievement and delivered quality, and test for gaming of exceptions and 
prevalence reporting.  For 2005/6 there are data on the numbers achieved for each indicator i in each 
disease domain k in each practice (Ngki), the numbers declared eligible for the indicator (Dgki) and the 
number exception reported  (Egki) as at 31 March 2006. But, to speed up the payment of practices, 
reported prevalence for a disease domain Pgk is recorded on 14th February, six weeks before the end 
of the financial year.  
 
Exception and prevalence measures  
 
The relationship between exceptions and numbers declared for indicator i in domain k by practice g is 
 
 Dgki  + Egki = Pgk + Agk =  TgkP                  (11) 
 
where Agk is the number of additional patients found by the practice in disease domain k between 15th 
February and 31st March.  At 31st March the total number of patients the practice could potentially 
declare for the denominator of the indicator is the number of patients in the disease domain declared 
as prevalent on 14th February plus new patients recorded between 15th February and 31st March as 
having the disease: TgkP  = Pgk + Agk.  Although Agk is not recorded we do know Dgki,  Egki, and Pgk for 
2005/6 and hence can calculate TgkP  = Dgki  + Egki for 2005/6.  We measure the exception reporting 
rate for indicator i in disease domain k as Egki/ (Dgki  + Egki).  
 
We expect that the age and sex mix of the practice population will affect reported prevalence Pgk 
since the age and sex mix is the main determinant of true prevalence. We could allow for 
demographics by including the proportions of the practice population as explanatory variables.  This 
would have a cost in terms of degrees of freedom and we have instead used the indirectly 
standardised reported prevalence ratio as the dependent variable in the regressions investigating 
reported prevalence. Expected prevalence figures for each practice were obtained by applying age 
and sex specific prevalence rates, obtained directly from practice records in a reference sample of 44 
practices, to all practice populations.8   The indirectly standardised reported prevalence ratio was 
obtained by dividing the observed prevalence reported in QOF by expected prevalence.9 We report 
prevalence regressions for 2005/6 in eight of the eleven disease domains because of the lack of 
information on (similarly defined) age and sex specific prevalence rates in cancer, mental health, and 
LVD.  The correlation between raw reported prevalence rates and indirectly standardised prevalence 
ratios for 2005/6 across all practices and the eight disease domains was 0.83 (p<0.001). 
 
Set of indicators used 
 
Some of the clinical indicators for a disease domain are applicable only to subsets of the prevalent 
population with that condition.  For example, for asthma, the prevalence report is the number of 
patients with asthma but indicator ASTHMA7 is the proportion of patients with asthma over the age of 
16 who have had influenza immunisation in the preceding 1 September to 31 March. We limit our 
analysis to 41 indicators where the target population is the whole population with the condition, not a 
subset of it. 
 
Reported and delivered quality 
 
We investigate the determinants of quality of care provided in practices.  Practices are rewarded for 
reported quality: the number (N) for whom an indicator has been achieved divided by the number of 
patients with the condition who are reported as suitable for the treatment (D).  Since practices may 
exception report patients for an indicator we prefer to measure quality by reference to the number of 
                                                 
8http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/servlet/controller?p_service=Content.show&p_applic=CCC&pContentID=1044 
9
 Pgk/ /o oka ag kag ag ka gaa a ap p pZ Z Z ¦ ¦ ¦  where okap   is the true prevalence rate for disease k in age and sex strata a in 
the reference sample practices,  pkag is the unobserved reported prevalence rate for disease k in age and sex strata a in 
practice g, Za is the proportion of sample practices’ population in age and sex strata a and Zag is the proportion of the 
population of practice g in age and sex strata a.  
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patients with the condition who could have benefited from a particular treatment. We therefore define 
the quality delivered to patients as the ratio of number treated to the number who could have been 
treated: N/(D+E).  
 
Upper threshold measures 
 
We test for differences in prevalence reporting and exception reporting between practices that are 
above and below the upper threshold.  For individual indicators we use a dummy variable Ugki (ind 
upper) taking the value 1 if practice g had reported achievement (Ngki/Dgki) above the upper threshold 
kiUD  for indicator i in disease domain k.  
 
Prevalence reporting affects points and the value per point for all indicators in a domain.  For models 
of prevalence reporting we include a measure of the average extent to which practice g was above 
the upper threshold in domain k:  dom uppergk = /o oki gki kii iUS S¦ ¦  where okiS  is the maximum 
number of points available for indicator i in disease domain k. 
 
3.3 Estimation methods 
 
The models of practice performance and reporting of prevalence are estimated by ordinary least 
squares. We estimated the exception reporting model by both ordinary least squares and by negative 
binomial regression using D+E as the exposure term.  In all models allowance is made for clustering 
within practices for prevalence models or within practices and disease domains for models of 
performance and exception reporting. The models also include 14 Health Board dummy variables to 
allow for unobserved area effects and local policies affecting the delivery of primary care. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Although the Department of Health had forecast that practices would achieve 75% of the maximum 
points in the first year of the scheme the mean score was over 90% and in 2005/6 it had increased to 
97.5%, with 15% of practices achieving maximum points. Table 2 shows the high and increasing 
proportion of Scottish practices achieving the upper thresholds (and hence maximum points for 
indicators) for the different disease domains.   
 
Table 5 shows, for 41 clinical indicators, the maximum points available, the upper threshold, the 
percentage of practices achieving the upper threshold, practices’ reported achievement (N/D), 
delivered quality (N/(D+E)) and exception reporting (E/( D+E).  The percentage achieving the 
threshold varied from 67.0 (DM10) to 99.3 (DM3). Delivered quality is lower than reported 
achievement, by virtue of its definition, but is also more variable across practices. Exception reporting 
ranges from 0.9% (THYROID2) to 27.5% (CHD10). 
 
Many practices treated more patients than necessary to achieve the maximum points on indicators.  
Some 90.8% had reported achievement above the upper threshold. They could have reduced the 
number treated by 12.4% without reducing their QOF revenue.  We interpret this substantial over 
achievement as evidence of GP altruism: practices are motivated by patient welfare as well as GP 
income. 10  
 
4.1 Reported achievement and delivered quality 
 
Table 8 reports the regression models examining the determinants of reported achievement (N/D) and 
delivered quality (N/(D+E)). Delivered quality is lower in practices with more income deprived patients, 
                                                 
10
 The averages are weighted by the maximum points achievable for each indicator.  Thus the percentage above the upper 
threshold is   1100 o og i i igi iU GS S u¦ ¦ ¦  where Ugi = 1 if practice g is above the upper threshold for indicator i, oiS  is the 
maximum points achievable for indicator i and G the number of practices. The average reduction in treatment possible without 
reducing QOF revenue is  1 1100 ( ) o og i igi gi iU gi i iU GD D D S S u ¦ ¦ ¦  where Dgi is achievement by practice g for indicator 
i (number treated divided by number declared eligible for treatment) and DiU is the upper threshold for indicator i. 
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more ethnic minority patients, and higher in rural and more sparsely populated areas.  This suggests 
that the quality gains arising from the QOF are delivered inequitably with respect to income and 
ethnicity.  
 
Table 8.  Determinants of reported achievement and delivered quality in Scottish practices 
2005/6: pooled regressions 
 Reported achievement Delivered quality 
 Coef t coef t 
SMR 
-0.004 -1.01 -0.005 -1.13 
Prop15less 4.267 1.47 2.883 0.91 
Prop75plus 
-12.238 -3.20 -6.188 -1.53 
Inc 
-0.041 -1.74 -0.120 -4.55 
Educ 
-0.524 -1.88 0.091 0.30 
Ethnicity 
-10.475 -2.01 -21.532 -3.71 
Rural 
-0.122 -0.46 0.743 2.62 
Sparsity 0.014 1.12 0.028 2.18 
Pop1000 
-0.147 -5.66 -0.111 -4.29 
Gp1000 0.205 0.98 -0.041 -0.19 
Pfemale 0.756 2.23 0.905 2.56 
Avgpage 
-0.015 -1.03 -0.042 -2.86 
Pcqnonuk 
-0.123 -0.31 -0.085 -0.20 
Pmscont 
-0.366 -1.31 -0.939 -3.34 
Dispensing 
-0.754 -2.31 -0.447 -1.28 
Exfh 0.594 4.39 0.114 0.80 
Herf 
-1.446 -3.74 -2.022 -4.75 
Constant 85.095 63.56 80.005 55.96 
2R   0.6667  0.7729 
N  35843  34705 
     
Achievement: 100*N/D.  Delivered quality: 100*N/(D+E), where N is number of patients for whom indicator was achieved, D is 
the number declared suitable by the practice, E is the number exception reported. OLS regressions also include 14 Health 
Board dummies and 40 indicator dummies.  Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering in practices. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, 
* p<0.05. 
 
Delivered quality was higher in practices with a higher proportion of female GPs and younger GPs. 
Larger practices have worse delivered quality as do those exposed to less competition as measured 
by the practice Herfindahl index. Practices with a PMS contract also have lower QOF quality but this 
may be due to the fact that they were improving other aspects of care by agreement with their local 
Health Boards.   
 
The differences between the effect of the explanatory variables on reported achievement and 
delivered quality are due to the way these variables affect exception reporting.  Thus for example, 
being an ex fundholder improves reported achievement and has no effect on delivered quality, 
suggesting that ex fundholders exception reported more patients.  Our exception reporting models 
provide more direct evidence of this.  
 
4.2 Reported prevalence 
 
We hypothesised that practices that expect to be below the upper threshold may under report 
prevalence and those who expected to be above the threshold over report. Table 9 reports two 
models in which prevalence reporting is pooled across 8 disease domains. The results are very 
similar for most of the coefficients and generally plausible. Reported prevalence is higher in practices 
with populations with higher standardised illness ratios and with more education deprivation. 11 
                                                 
11
 The standardised illness ratio (SIR), income deprivation and employment deprivation are extremely highly correlated. We 
used income deprivation, and dropped SIR and employment deprivation in the reported achievement and delivered quality 
models because of the considerable interest in income related inequity in health care delivery (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 
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Reported prevalence is higher in practices with a higher proportion of female GPs and younger GPs. 
It is also higher in practices with more GPs per patient, suggesting that such practices have a lower 
cost of case finding.   
 
Table 9  Determinants of prevalence reporting in Scottish practices 2005/6: pooled models 
Dependent variable Standardised reported prevalence rate 2005/61 
 Coef. t Coef. t 
dom upper 
-4.418 -1.62   
dom upper_lag  4.060 3.02 
Sir 0.392 5.85 0.398 5.96 
SMR 0.011 0.43 0.014 0.56 
Educ 8.517 4.07 8.510 4.09 
Ethnicity 
-90.071 -3.60 -100.854 -3.11 
Rural 
-1.743 -0.96 -1.934 -1.07 
Sparsity 
-0.318 -4.93 -0.329 -5.14 
pop1000 
-0.426 -1.71 -0.414 -1.70 
gp1000 5.677 4.41 5.581 4.32 
Pfemale 3.717 1.81 3.512 1.73 
Avgpage 
-0.291 -3.54 -0.284 -3.50 
Pcqnonuk 1.605 0.58 1.347 0.48 
Pmscont 
-0.005 0.00 1.010 0.69 
Dispensing 
-0.187 -0.11 0.902 0.58 
Exfh 0.787 0.98 0.486 0.60 
Herf 6.604 2.71 7.131 2.97 
Constant 73.135 7.76 64.842 7.19 
2R  0.2325  0.2354  
N 7318  7214  
 
1 Age and sex indirectly standardised disease reported prevalence. 
 t stats are robust and allow for clustering within practices. All models are OLS and include 14 NHS Board dummies.  
dom upper:  proportion of indicators in domain for which practice achieved upper threshold in 2005/6.  weighted by max points 
for indicators  
dom upper_lag:  proportion of indicators in domain for which practice achieved upper threshold in 2004/5 weighted by max 
points for indicators. 
 
Model 1 includes a variable measuring the average extent to which the practice was above the upper 
threshold for the indicators in the disease domain (dom upper). It has a negative and insignificant 
coefficient. But whether the practice is above or below the upper threshold is endogenous, so that the 
coefficients on our measure of the practice being above or below the upper threshold (dom upper) will 
be biased.  If an unobserved factor increases prevalence the practice is more likely, ceteris paribus, to 
be below the upper threshold.  Hence the coefficients on dom upper will be biased downwards.   
 
Model 2 uses lag dom upper, measuring the extent to which the practice was above the upper 
threshold in the previous year.  The coefficient on the lag dom upper is positive and significant, 
suggesting that practices game prevalence reporting. 
 
The pooled model forces the effects of the covariates to be the same for all disease domains. Given 
the differences in aetiology this is implausible.  We therefore report results from separate models for 
standardised prevalence reporting in 2005/6 for eight disease domains in Table 10. There are 
noticeable differences in the effects of explanatory variables across the domains. The most striking is 
the effect of ethnicity, which is negative in seven of the domains but positive in the case of diabetes, a 
condition where ethnic minority patients are known to be at higher risk. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2000).  However, for the models investigating exception and prevalence reporting it is more important to attempt to control for 
factors directly affecting health and so we include SIR, omitting income and employment deprivation. 
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Table 10  Determinants of prevalence reporting in Scottish practices 2005/6 
Disease: CHD Diabetes Asthma COPD Epilepsy BP Thyroid Stroke 
dom upper lag 3.007 10.384 7.491 0.046 1.961 3.643 4.793 9.182 
 1.164 4.217 2.815 0.011 0.710 2.055 1.162 2.468 
 
        
Sir 0.451 0.202 0.105 1.363 0.881 -0.002 -0.005 0.226 
 5.191 2.769 1.059 6.120 5.905 -0.021 -0.055 2.046 
SMR 0.041 0.075 0.007 -0.029 -0.031 0.006 0.018 0.026 
 1.34 3.029 0.239 -0.414 -0.773 0.187 0.331 0.609 
Educ 9.209 17.012 5.362 18.204 -4.372 9.656 1.464 10.336 
 3.39 7.06 1.692 2.56 -0.901 3.74 0.479 2.897 
Ethnicity 
-108.923 115.344 -83.41 -189.902 -289.743 -68.023 -74.551 -103.521 
 
-2.633 1.529 -2.547 -2.512 -5.413 -1.849 -1.564 -3.011 
Rural 
-3.108 -1.73 -3.492 1.531 -2.209 -2.844 -2.138 -1.722 
 
-1.234 -0.924 -1.347 0.374 -0.665 -1.18 -0.651 -0.48 
Sparsity 
-0.179 -0.154 -0.484 -0.381 -0.673 -0.199 -0.33 -0.231 
 
-2.056 -2.019 -3.68 -2.189 -4.204 -2.316 -2.626 -1.869 
pop1000 
-0.054 -0.511 -0.083 -0.784 -0.202 -0.73 -0.832 -0.08 
 
-0.145 -2.26 -0.304 -1.656 -0.681 -2.419 -2.59 -0.198 
gp1000 
-0.368 0.986 7.706 10.781 15.005 2.658 -1.145 9.628 
 
-0.211 0.668 3.254 2.674 4.517 1.465 -0.404 3.878 
Pfemale 0.294 0.149 2.036 10.714 -0.193 2.858 7.646 4.255 
 0.103 0.06 0.578 1.475 -0.046 0.997 1.881 1.083 
avgpage 
-0.239 -0.218 -0.376 -0.415 -0.276 -0.089 -0.107 -0.514 
 
-2.362 -2.278 -2.712 -1.649 -1.492 -0.739 -0.609 -3.125 
pcqnonuk 2.395 2.813 1.624 8.811 -7.021 5.536 -1.676 -1.775 
 0.64 0.809 0.417 1.089 -1.207 1.475 -0.332 -0.353 
pmscont 1.634 0.149 1.785 4.446 1.073 -0.757 -4.295 4.096 
 0.956 0.086 0.619 0.925 0.433 -0.328 -2.037 1.329 
dispensing 3.058 3.996 4.809 -2.285 -1.323 1.16 5.735 -7.157 
 1.387 2.349 1.692 -0.638 -0.28 0.468 1.186 -2.382 
Exfh 0.345 0.099 0.149 5.488 -1.204 -1.911 -2.091 3.057 
 0.311 0.096 0.107 2.116 -0.694 -1.559 -1.346 1.895 
Herf 2.558 13.258 9.473 7.516 -9.872 10.822 12.19 11.138 
 0.699 4.09 2.455 1.118 -2.121 3.052 2.983 2.331 
constant 58.535 61.601 86.44 -9.515 26.992 105.239 89.728 85.911 
 5.094 5.311 6.272 -0.334 1.397 8.776 5.934 5.377 
2R  0.6020 0.5694 0.1511 0.6218 0.4210 0.2032 0.5190 0.3176 
N 903 902 903 902 895 903 903 903 
Dependent variables: age and sex indirectly standardised disease reported prevalence 2005/6.  All models included 14 NHS 
Board dummies.  OLS coefficient reported above robust t statistic adjusted for clustering within practices. 
 
The effect of upper dom lag is positive in all domains and is significant in four of them, suggesting that 
practices that had been above the upper thresholds in the domain in 2004/5 gamed their reporting of 
prevalence upward compared with those who were below the upper thresholds. 
 
4.3 Exception reporting 
 
Table 11 reports regressions of exception reporting pooled over 41 indicators. In all models exception 
reporting is higher in practices with sicker patients and with populations drawn from areas with a 
higher ethnic minority proportion. Exception rates are lower in rural areas. Practices that were 
fundholding have higher exception reporting.   
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Table 11. Determinants of exception reporting in Scottish practices 2005/6: pooled regressions 
 OLS models1 Negative binomial models2 
 Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
Ind upper 0.786 4.92   0.145 6.67   
Lag_ind upper   
-0.865 -7.60   -0.151 -9.42 
Sir 0.032 3.69 0.028 3.25 0.003 2.64 0.003 2.23 
SMR 0.004 1.27 0.005 1.34 0.001 2.20 0.001 2.23 
Prop15less 1.526 0.59 1.751 0.68 -0.265 -0.71 -0.171 -0.46 
Prop75plus 
-4.829 -1.56 -6.054 -1.96 -0.824 -1.65 -0.912 -1.83 
Educ 
-0.674 -2.42 -0.636 -2.31 -0.105 -2.41 -0.102 -2.36 
Ethnicity 15.925 4.99 15.298 4.88 1.892 5.02 1.817 4.79 
Rural 
-1.063 -5.61 -1.031 -5.48 -0.194 -5.49 -0.185 -5.25 
Sparsity 
-0.012 -1.38 -0.012 -1.39 -0.002 -1.19 -0.002 -1.25 
Pop1000 
-0.026 -1.26 -0.028 -1.34 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.02 
Gp1000 0.298 1.80 0.328 1.98 0.048 2.08 0.052 2.24 
Pfemale 
-0.175 -0.61 -0.070 -0.25 0.026 0.62 0.045 1.10 
Avgpage 0.015 1.27 0.012 1.05 0.002 1.12 0.002 0.87 
Pcqnonuk 0.146 0.41 0.116 0.32 0.024 0.46 0.027 0.52 
Pmscont 0.585 3.02 0.569 2.94 0.045 1.56 0.037 1.26 
Dispensing 
-0.440 -1.72 -0.500 -1.95 -0.045 -0.94 -0.060 -1.27 
Exfh 0.413 3.49 0.473 4.00 0.065 3.42 0.074 3.91 
Herf 0.747 2.35 0.640 2.03 0.057 1.07 0.043 0.80 
Constant 3.892 3.10 5.793 4.65 -3.072 -16.52 -2.765 -14.99 
2R  0.5907  0.5919      
Initial Log L     
-117311.5  -117311.5  
Model Log L     
-102843.9  -102773.0  
N 34705  34705  34705  34705  
        
 
1
 OLS models: dependent variable is the exception reporting rate [100*E/(D+E)]  
2
 Negative binomial regressions of E using (D+E) as the exposure term 
All models also contain 14 NHS Board dummies and 40 indicator dummies. Robust t statistics allow for clustering of indicators 
in practices. 
ind upper = 1 if practice above upper threshold in 2005/6 for indicator, 0 otherwise. 
lag_ind upper: = 1 if practice above upper threshold in 2004/5 for indicator, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
In model 1 the coefficient on the dummy ind upper (which equals 1 if the practice is above the upper 
threshold for the indicator in 2005/6) is positive.  ind upper is positively correlated with unobserved 
factors which increase exception reporting and thus increase achievement and so may fail to reflect 
the incentives for practices expecting to be under the upper threshold to increase exceptions.  
 
Model 2 uses ind upper lag, a dummy equalling 1 if the practice was above the upper threshold in the 
previous year. The coefficient on ind upper lag is negative and highly significant. It suggests that 
practices that were above the upper threshold in 2004/5 had exception reporting rates that were about 
0.87% lower in 2005/6 than practices which were below the lower threshold in 2004/5. Given that the 
average exception rate in 2005/6 was 7.92%, the proportionate effect on exception reporting is large. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The fact that practices could have treated substantially fewer patients (12.5%) without falling below 
the upper thresholds for indicators and thereby reducing practice revenue is compatible with altruistic 
motivation. 
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Although the median practice achieved 99.2% of the available points, the percentage of patients with 
a particular condition who received the appropriate care was rather lower at 80.2%.12  
 
Delivered quality was inequitable with respect to the income and ethnicity of the populations in the 
areas from which practices drew their lists.  This is in contrast with consultations with general 
practitioners: allowing for morbidity, income has no effect on consultations, and some ethnic minority 
groups have more than expected numbers of consultations (Morris, Sutton and Gravelle, 2005).  
Similar results were obtained in earlier studies of the first year of the QOF in Scotland (McLean et al, 
2006) and England (Doran et al, 2006). Practices with more female GPs and with younger GPs 
deliver higher quality.   
 
Reported prevalence was strongly positively correlated with other measures of morbidity and with 
educational deprivation. Reported prevalence thus appears, unsurprisingly to be strongly affected by 
genuine prevalence.  
 
Practices with a higher proportion of female GPs or with younger GPs had higher reported 
prevalence. Since such practices also had higher delivered quality this suggests that female and 
younger GPs are perhaps more conscientious in delivering care to their patients. The fact that 
reported prevalence was associated with practice characteristics implies that extreme caution should 
be exercised in using QOF reported prevalence rates to measure population prevalence of disease. 
 
Our tests show evidence of gaming of prevalence reporting. The lagged measure of the extent to 
which the practice was above the upper threshold, and hence had an incentive to increase reported 
prevalence, was positive and statistically significant in models where we pooled observations across 
disease domains. In the models estimated separately for the eight disease domains, it is positive in all 
cases and significant in four cases.  
 
Exception reporting is higher in practices in areas with higher rates of population morbidity and with a 
higher proportion from an ethnic minority. Exception reporting is lower by practices in areas with 
higher education deprivation and in rural areas. These are factors that plausibly ought to affect 
exception reporting in the absence of gaming. However, we found that exception reporting was also 
correlated with practice characteristics, such as whether the practice was an ex-fundholder. Since the 
permitted grounds for exception reporting relate to patient rather than practice characteristics, this 
suggests that practices were over reporting exceptions.  
 
Our more direct tests for gaming of exceptions also suggested that there was gaming of exceptions 
upward for 2005/6 by practices that were below the upper threshold for indicators in 2004/5 and so 
expected to be otherwise below the upper threshold in 2005/6.   
 
If there are persistent unobserved factors which affect exception reporting then our test for gaming will 
still be subject to endogeneity bias. However the bias is to increase the coefficient on the lagged 
dummy variable recording whether the practice was above the upper threshold in 2004/5. The fact 
that we find negative coefficients that are statistically and quantitatively significant on the lagged 
upper threshold dummies is strong evidence for gaming of exception reporting.  
 
The introduction of the QOF may have had its intended consequence: the first year of the QOF seems 
to have show above trend performance against some clinical indicators.  However, it also appears to 
have had unintended consequences in GPs’ gaming of reported prevalence and exception rates.   
                                                 
12
 Average over the 41 indicators in Table 5 weighted by the maximum available points. 
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Appendices 
 
A.  Grounds for exception reporting 
 
A) patients who have been recorded as refusing to attend review who have been invited on at least 
three occasions during the preceding twelve months.  
 
B) patients for whom it is not appropriate to review the chronic disease parameters due to particular 
circumstances eg terminal illness, extreme frailty. 
  
C) patients newly diagnosed within the practice or who have recently registered with the practice, who 
should have measurements made within three months and delivery of clinical standards within nine 
months eg blood pressure or cholesterol measurements within target levels. 
  
D) patients who are on maximum tolerated doses of medication whose levels remain sub-optimal. 
  
E) patients for whom prescribing a medication is not clinically appropriate eg those who have an 
allergy, another contraindication or have experienced an adverse reaction. 
  
F) where a patient has not tolerated medication. 
  
G) where a patient does not agree to investigation or treatment (informed dissent), and this has been 
recorded in their medical records. 
  
H) where the patient has a supervening condition which makes treatment of their condition 
inappropriate eg cholesterol reduction where the patient has liver disease. 
  
I) where an investigative service or secondary care service is unavailable.  
 
Source: GMS Statement of Financial Entitlements, 30 March 2005.  
 
 
B.  Reported prevalence and revenue 
 
Practice g revenue from indicator i in disease domain k is  
1 12 2
1
1/ ( ) / ( / )hgki g ki gki gk g hk hR v M M P M G P MS D
ª ºª º ª º ¦¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼   
               ( ) ( )g ki gki gk gkv F PS D                    (A1) 
where ( ) min{1,max{( ) /( ),0}}ogki ki gki ki gki kiL kiU kiLS S D S D D D D    and Dgki = Ngki/(Pgk – Egki). 
For Dgki  (DkiL, DkiU) , /gki gkR Pw w  has the same sign as 
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C. Comparative statics 
 
The practice objective function is  
      ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )s N E P bN R N E P C N E P    
               ( ) ( )bN v F PS D      1 1 1/ /o o oN E Pc N c E E P c P P M      
                    221 2 22 ( ) /o oN Ec N c E E Pª  «¬  22 ( ) /oPc P P M º  »¼       (A14) 
R is twice differentiable except at DL where the derivative of points S(D) with respect to achievement Sc  
jumps from zero to positive and at DU where it jumps down to zero.  C is also twice differentiable 
except at Eo (and Po) where the derivative with respect to E (and P) jumps from negative to positive.  
 
Proposition 1. For any given vector of cost parameters, true prevalence, true exceptions and list size, 
there exist b1, b2, b3, b4 (with b1 < b2 < b3 < b4) such that for all b < b1 the practice optimum has D < DL 
, for 2 3( , )b b b  the optimum has ( , )L UD D D  and for b > b4 the optimum has D  > DU.   
 
Solutions with D < DL 
 
The first order conditions are  
 0, 0, 0N N Ns b C N s N  d t                                  (A15)  
 0E E E Es C s C
     ! !                        (A16) 
 0P P Ps C C
    ! !                   (A17) 
where superscripts +, –  indicate left and right sided derivatives with respect to E evaluated at E*L = Eo 
and similarly for P at P*L = Po.  The solution has E*L = Eo, P*L = Po since gaming generates no 
additional revenue when D
 
< DU.  Since sN(0,Eo,Po) = b – CN(0,Eo,Po) = b – cP1 and cP1 is finite there 
always exists a sufficiently high b (b1) (or small cP1) such that N*L(b) > 0 for b > b1. It is also obvious 
that N*L(b) (and hence D*L = N*L/(P*L – E*L)) is increasing in b.  
 
Solutions with D  (DL, DU)   
 
Consider first solutions with D  (DL, DU) and where the cost parameters cE1 and cP1 are small enough 
that the optimal E*UL z Eo and P*UL z Po. The first order conditions are 
 0
NN N N N
s b R C b v F CS Dc              (A18)   
 0E E E E Es R C v F CS Dc             (A19)   
 ( ) 0P P P P Ps R C v F v F CS D S Dc c             (A20)   
Recall that when D  (DL, DU),  RE > 0 and RP < 0,  so that the solution has CE > 0 and CP < 0 which 
requires E*UL > Eo and P*UL < Po.   
 
The second order partials of s(N,E,P) are 
 NN NNs C   < 0          (A21) 
 EE EE EEs v F CS Dc   < 0         (A22) 
 2PP PP P PPs v F v F v F CS D S D Sc c c cc     < 0                   (A23) 
 0NE NEs v FS Dc !                (A24)                   
NP NP Ns v F v FS D S Dc c c     
           
1 ( )o o oL L
P
U L U L U L
N v F v F v FS S D D S DDD D D D D D
 ª º c c  « »  ¬ ¼
 
        
1
o
L
P
U L
N R v FS DD D
 ª ºc « »¬ ¼
 < 0                    (A25) 
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 2EP EP E NP Ns v F v F v F v FS D S D S D D S D Dc c c c c c     
       > @2NP NPs v FD S D Dc   < 0         (A26) 
The sign of sNN follows from the convexity of the cost function.  Since DEE = DPP > 0, the signs of sEE 
and sPP require the stronger restrictions that marginal costs of E and P are increasing faster than the 
marginal revenue from E and P.  sNE > 0 follows from DNE > 0.  sNP < 0 since adding the term 
1( )o L U Lv FS D D D  c to Rp changes the square bracketed term in (A13) to ( ) 2
gki gki
gk gki gkP E P
D D  < 0.  
Finally sEP < 0 because sNP < 0 and DNP < 0.  
 
The signs of the cross partials are not sufficient to ensure that s(N,E,P) is strictly concave but they do 
ensure some definite comparative static results.  Since sNb = 1, sEb = 0, sPb = 0 we have  
 
*
2 1( ) 0
UL
EE PP PE
N
s s s
b
w ª º   ' !¬ ¼w          (A27) 
 > @* 1 0UL EN PP PN EPE s s s sb 
w   ' !w          (A28) 
 > @* 1 0UL EN PE PN EEP s s s sb 
w    ' w          (A29) 
where the Hessian ' < 0 since s(N,E,P) is locally concave in the neighbourhood of the solution.  Local 
concavity also implies that the principal minor sEEsPP – (sPE)2 > 0, hence establishing the sign of (A27).  
The signs (A28) and (A29) follow from ' < 0 and the signs of the cross partials previously established. 
Since wN*UL/wb >  0 and 
* *
0
UL ULP E
b b
w w w w  we also have wD
*UL/wb > 0.  
 
Given the separability of cost function in N, E, and P similar arguments establish that an increase in 
cN1 or cN2 reduces N*UL and E*UL, increases P*UL, and hence reduces D*UL. 
 
Now consider solutions with D  (DL, DU) and the cost parameter cE1 large enough that the optimal 
E*UL = Eo  so that the first order conditions are 
 0
NN N N N
s b R C b v F CS Dc                          (A30) 
 0E E E E E Es R C s R C
     ! !           (A31) 
 ( ) 0P P P P Ps R C v F v F CS D S Dc c             (A32) 
where ,E Es s
 
 are the left and right sided derivatives of s with respect to E evaluated at Eo.  Then we 
can use the local concavity of s in N and P and the signs of sNN and sNP to establish that wN*UL/wb >  0, 
wP*UL/wb < 0 and wD*UL/wb > 0.  If the first order condition (A31) on E is replaced by  
 0E E E E E Es R C s R C
     !            (A33) 
Then an increase in b will also increase E*UL from Eo.  (Suppose not. But then the increase in D*UL via 
the increase in N*UL and the reduction in P*UL will increase RE = 1 2( ) ( )o oU Lv N P ES D D     and 
0Es
 ! .) 
 
Similar arguments apply to cases where D  (DL, DU) with P*UL = Po and where D  (DL, DU) with E*UL = 
Eo, P*UL = Po.  Thus for all solutions with D  (DL, DU) we have established that wN*UL/wb >  0, wE*UL/wb 
t 0, wP*UL/wb d 0 and wD*UL/wb > 0, with strict inequalities holding for low enough marginal costs of 
gaming. 
 
Existence of solutions with D  (DL, DU) 
 
The first order condition (A15) for solutions with D < DL implies that N*L(b) = (b – cN1)/cN2 for b t b1 = 
cP1. Now consider bc  defined by N*L(bc) = DL(Po – Eo).  We have 
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10 ( )o oN N N Ns b C s v P E b CS  c c c                 (A34) 
Hence there must exist a b2 < bc such that 
   1* * * *2 2 2 2 2 2( ( )) 0 ( ) ( ) ( ( ))L LUN Nb C N b b v P b E b C N bS c             (A35) 
and the practice is indifferent between the two solutions at b2.  For b > b2 it strictly prefers solutions 
with D
 
 > DL.  
 
Solutions with D  (DU, 1) 
 
Solutions above the upper threshold with D  (DU, 1) satisfy 
 0N Ns b C                   (A36)   
 0E E Es C C
    ! !                  (A37)   
 0oP P P Ps R C v F CS c                 (A38) 
and E*U = Eo, P*U > Po.  Since N does not affect sP increases in b or reductions in the marginal cost of 
N have no effect on P* and E* but do increase N*U and D*U.  With sufficiently high b or low marginal 
cost parameters on N the solution N*U = P*U – Eo, D*U = 1 is obtained. 
 
Solutions with D = DU 
 
The first order condition (A18) on N for solutions with D  (DL, DU) solves for  
      
  1* * 1* 1
2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
o UL UL
U L PUL N P
P P
P b E b b cR b cN b
c c
S D D ª º     ¬ ¼         (A39) 
We know that P*UL(b) is decreasing and E*UL(b) increasing in b. Hence N*UL(b) increases at least 
linearly with b and so must D*UL(b).  Hence there exists b3 > b2 such that 
3
*lim ( )UL
b b
bDo  = DU  where 
limit is from below. The same conclusion holds if E*UL(b) = Eo or P*UL(b) = Po. 
 
The first order condition on N for solutions with D  (DU, 1) solves for  
 
* 1
2
( )L P
P
b cN b
c
            (A40) 
which is increasing linearly with b. So is D*U(b) since E*U and P*U do not vary with b.  Thus there exists 
a b4 such that  
4
*lim ( )U
b b
bDo  = DU where the limit is from above.  Since P*UL(b) d Po d P*U(b) and 
E*UL(b) t Eo = E*U comparison of (A39)  and (A40) shows that b4 > b3. 
 
For solutions b  (b3, b4) where D = DU, we substitute for N = DU(P – E) in s(N,E,P) and obtain the first 
order conditions 
 ( ) 0E U NC b CD     
 
( ) 0P P U NR C b CD     
when * ( )UE b  >  Eo and * ( )UP b  < Po. Differentiation respect to b shows that * ( ) /UE b bw w < 0, 
* ( ) /UP b bw w  > 0 and * ( ) /UN b bw w  > 0.  If solutions with D = DU have * ( )UE b > Eo and * ( )UP b  = Po, 
then * ( ) /UE b bw w < 0 and * ( ) /UN b bw w > 0.  Conversely if * ( )UE b =  Eo and * ( )UP b  < Po, then 
* ( ) /UP b bw w > 0 and * ( ) /UN b bw w  > 0.  Finally if  * ( )UE b =  Eo and * ( )UP b = Po, then 
* ( ) /UN b bw w = 0. 
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We summarise the comparative static properties of the model within solution types in the table. 
 
Comparative statics 
  Effect on 
Increase in Solution type N
 
E P D 
Altruism b (or reduction in 
marginal cost of N ( , )L UD D D  + + –  + 
 
UD D!  + 0 0  + 
List size M; maximum points oS  ( , )L UD D D  + + –  + 
 
UD D!  0 0 + – 
True exceptions Eo ( , )L UD D D  + + –  + 
 
UD D!  0 0 0 0 
True prevalence Po ( , )L UD D D  – – + – 
 
UD D!  0 0 + – 
 
 
 
